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Papers in Organizations – Editor’s Foreword 
 
The purpose of the series Papers in Organization is to work as a stepping-stone towards final 
publication in scientific journals. As such, PIO is a working-paper series, yet with a distinct 
position in the process towards final publication. The aim of PIO is to be the final stepping-
stone in that process: 
- For the author PIO should add value to the work in progress through the editorial proc-
ess. A publication in PIO is thus also a measure of the quality of the work – it is no 
longer simply a draft or an informal contribution to debates, but a work close to final 
publication. 
 
- For the reader PIO should be a good place to be if one wants to keep track of contem-
porary research within the international field of organization studies. Indeed, many of 
the papers are manuscripts, which have been submitted to social science journals and as 
such appear in a rather final stage of completion. Others may contribute with empirical 
results from ongoing research projects or may in a more theoretical sense contribute to 
current academic disputes. 
 
In this paper, Mie Augier and David Teece outline the history and development of the ideas 
underlying an emerging approach within strategic management research: the dynamic capabili-
ties framework. The framework was first outlined by Teece and Pisano (1994), and in the pre-
sent paper elaborated further so the reader will be able to appreciate some of the most impor-
tant intellectual resources underpinning it, such as the work of Schumpeter, Penrose, William-
son, Cyert and March, Rummelt, Nelson and Winter. Although listed as intellectual resources 
by the authors, they also turn (some of) them into a topic for further discussion. For example, 
Augier and Teece identify not only the merits but also the limitations of transaction costs eco-
nomics. In this way, the authors pave the way for a more dynamic framework while drawing 
upon organization theory and scholars like Cyert and March (a behavioral theory of the firm) 
and Nelson and Winter (an evolutionary theory of economic change). In the dynamic capability 
framework firms and markets co-evolve. Managers are now allowed to perform distinct strate-
gic roles in shaping both firms and their markets, e.g. through asset- selection and orchestra-
tion, including also the task of allocating resources between exploitation and exploration. 
 
 
Kjell Tryggestad/Søren Christensen 
Editors
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is wide agreement that Joseph 
Schumpeter’s ideas helped initiate or at 
least energize many developments in twen-
tieth century economics. These include evo-
lutionary economics, organization theory, 
the theory of technological change, and, of 
course, entrepreneurship.  Various neo-
schumpterian traditions have also emerged 
in the field of business and corporate strat-
egy.  The business firm has been conceptu-
alized by strategy scholars as consisting of 
bundles or “portfolios” of fixed assets and 
(production) competencies/capabilities.2 In 
recent years these ideas have become inte-
grated into theories of the firm and eco-
nomic organization.  Indeed, the compe-
tences and capabilities tradition have gar-
nered wide currency and is now generally 
accepted (Teece, 1982, 1986; Rumelt, 
1984; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 2000; Win-
ter, 2000, 2003; Teece and Pisano, 1994, 
Teece et al 1997; Teece, 2003).3  
                                                 
                                                                       
2 Although the idea and terminology of organiza-
tions as bundles of competencies dates back to Os-
kar Morgenstern (1951), the more well known origi-
nator of the term was Philip Selznick (1957).  Sel-
znick introduced the idea of a firm’s ‘distinctive 
competence’; and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) popu-
larized the idea of the ‘core competencies’ of the 
organization.  For a discussion of some of these 
developments, see Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000).  
 
3 Richardson (1972) relied on Edith Penrose’s 
(1959) idea of the firm as a collection of resources 
yielding various productive services.  As Richardson 
(1972, p. 888) noted: “It is convenient to think of 
industry as carrying out an indefinitely large number 
of activities, activities related to the discovery and 
estimation of future wants, to research, develop-
There are both static and dynamic versions 
of the competences and capabilities tradi-
tion.  Whereas the lineage of static versions 
of the capabilities framework can be traced 
to Ricardo, the lineage of dynamic versions 
can be attributed to Schumpeter (Teece et 
al, 1997, 2003). Scholars in strategic man-
agement, organizational theory, organiza-
tional economics, sociology, and innova-
tion studies have embraced the dynamic 
version of capabilities with considerable 
enthusiasm.  
 
This paper sketches the history of the de-
velopment of the ideas underlying modern 
approaches to competencies and (dynamic) 
capabilities.4 In addition to providing a co-
herent framework for studying strategic 
management under conditions of uncer-
tainty, rapid technological change and am-
biguity, the dynamic capabilities frame-
work is also well suited to the analysis of 
learning, thereby facilitating the integration 
of economic, organizational, and strategic 
 
ment, and design, to the execution and co-ordination 
of processes of physical transformation, the market-
ing of goods, and so on.  And we have to recognize 
that these activities have to be carried out by organi-
zations with appropriate capabilities, or, in other 
words, with appropriate knowledge, experience, and 
skills”. 
 
4 For a history of the field of strategy in general, see 
Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994).  The present 
paper focuses more narrowly on the history of (dy-
namic) capabilities and competencies within strate-
gic management.  More specific discussions of the 
nature of dynamic capabilities are found in Winter 
(2003) and Teece (2003). 
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issues (Levinthal and March, 1993; Winter 
and Zollo, 2002).   
 
2. Antecedents and brief history 
2.1.  Introduction 
The field of strategic management has in 
recent years leveraged off of theories of 
economic organization in general and theo-
ries of the firm in particular.  This was not 
always so.  When Rumelt (1984) identified 
“a strategic theory of the firm” and pro-
nounced that the study of business strategy 
must take off from economic theories of the 
firm, the linkages between economic theo-
ries of the firm and strategic management 
were either weak or non-existent.  Tensions 
existed and in many respects still remain, 
between the neoclassical theory of the firm 
and strategic management.  This is because 
of the cavalier treatment in economics of 
know-how, the static focus of neoclassical 
theory, and the strong behavioral assump-
tions around (hyper)rationality embedded in 
neoclassical theory (Winter and Teece, 
1984; Teece, 1984;  Simon, 1993).   
 
Over the past 50 years, some progress had 
been made in the social sciences to help 
craft more realistic foundations for the the-
ory of the firm.  For instance, the ideas of 
Simon, Cyert and March on ‘bounded ra-
tionality’, opportunistic behavior, and rou-
tines were significant inputs for the emerg-
ing perspectives of transaction cost eco-
nomics and evolutionary economics.  Fur-
ther, it had long been in the tradition of 
neoschumpeterian economists to emphasize 
innovation, technological change, and evo-
lution.  And in the mid 1980s, strategy 
scholars began to realize the usefulness of 
these developments in understanding firm 
behavior.  For example, Teece (1984) ar-
gued that the evolutionary ideas of Nelson 
and Winter would help in providing a the-
ory of the firm’s distinctive competencies.  
Routines could be thought of as the skills of 
the organization, and the firm as an entity 
with a limited range of capabilities based 
on its available routines and physical assets.  
The emphasis in this emerging literature on 
routines introduces the idea of path depend-
ency; a firms capabilities are defined very 
much by where it has been in the past and 
what it has done; and its current perform-
ance is a function of engrained repertoires 
(Dosi, 1988; Teece, 1984; March, 1994).  
Path dependencies and established techno-
logical trajectories shape the opportunities 
faced by firms.5   
                                                 
5 Many writers have pointed to Schumpeter’s ideas 
of ‘creative destruction’ underlying the modern 
emphasis on technological change.  However, it is 
worth noting that Schumpeter didn’t reserve the 
term for just technological change; for him, it was 
useful for analyzing many areas of the economy.  As 
he noted: “This concept covers the following five 
cases: (1) The introduction of a new good—that is 
one with which consumers are not yet familiar—or 
of a new quality of a good.  (2) The introduction of a 
new method of production, that is one not yet tested 
by experience in the branch of manufacture con-
cerned, which need by no means be founded upon a 
discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a 
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In order to position neoschumpeterian ideas 
on competences and capabilities, we sum-
marize below relevant theories in organiza-
tional economics/theories of the firm.  Our 
purpose is to compare and contrast them to 
dynamic capabilities.  
sustained   It may earn Ricardian (quasi) 
rents, but such quasi rents will be competed 
away, often rather quickly.  It cannot earn 
Schumpeterian rents because it hasn’t built 
the capacity to be continually innovative.  
Nor is it likely to be able to earn monopoly 
(Porterian) rents since these require exclu-
sive behavior or strategic manipulation 
(Teece, 2003).  
 
Dynamic capabilities refer to the particular 
(non-immitability) capacity firms have to 
shape, reshape, configure and reconfigure 
those assets so as to respond to changing 
technologies and markets. Dynamic capa-
bilities, therefore, relate to the firm’s ability 
to adapt in order to generate and exploit 
internal and external firm specific compe-
tences, and to address the firms changing 
environment (Teece et al, 1997). As Collis 
(1994) and Winter (2003) note, one element 
of dynamic capabilities is that they govern 
the rate of change of ordinary capabilities.6  
If a firm possesses resources/competences 
but lacks dynamic capabilities, it has a 
chance to make a competitive return for a 
short period, but superior returns cannot be 
 
An illustration of some of the issues in-
volved in the dynamic capability frame-
work is found in the story of the British pop 
group, Spice Girls. The group made pop-
history in the late 90s with their successes 
(being the first female group to win 9 num-
ber 1 hit-singles – only Elvis, Cliff Richard, 
Madonna and the Beatles ever had more). 
The band was the result of two entrepreneu-
rial and innovative management gurus (Bob 
and Chris Herbert) who in 1994 handpicked 
the five members to sing in a team (at first 
called ‘Touch’, the band name (and the 
manager) was changed in 1996). After a 
few years of success, the band broke up and 
the individual band members tried to pur-
sue solo careers. However, none of them 
were able to replicate the success of the 
band as a team (or organization), and pop-
industry experts commented that only if the 
band got together again would they be able 
to return to the success of previous years. In 
other words, it was the dynamic orchestra-
tion of individual skills and knowledge in 
                                                                        
new way of handling a commodity commercially.  
(3) The opening of a new market, that is a market 
into which the particular branch of manufacture of 
the country in question has not previously entered, 
whether or not this market has existed before. (4) 
The conquest of a new source of supply of raw ma-
terials or half-manufactured goods, again irrespec-
tive of whether this source already exists or whether 
it has first to be created. (5) The carrying out of the 
new organization of any industry, like the creation 
of a monopoly position (for examplethrough trustifi-
cation) or the breaking up of a monopoly position. 
(Schumpeter, 1934, p. 66). 
 
6 For the particulars on the specific nature of differ-
ent types of dynamic capabilities, see Teece (2003). 
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the organization of the band that created the 
success. Once apart, their individual capa-
bilities were no longer productive. The solo 
careers of several of the Spice Girls ended 
abruptly.  
There is much utility and exploratory power 
in the transaction cost framework.  How-
ever, the contractual scheme upon which it 
is built deals with existing resources and 
does not examine how new resources are 
discovered, how they are accumulated, and 
how firms learn.  The structure and behav-
ior of the modern business firm cannot be 
fully explained by appealing to transaction 
costs alone.  The focus for the “main case” 
in transaction cost economics is governance 
–  i.e. how things should be organized.  
This is an important element of manage-
ment; but it isn’t the main concern of man-
agement scholars or practitioners.  While it 
is important to have the right governance, it 
is of equal - if not greater - importance to 
make the right investment choices, select 
the right assets to “govern”, and establish 
the correct business model.  Superior or-
ganizational capabilities require not just 
astute initial asset selection; they also re-
quire continuous reconfiguration and im-
provement.  The transaction cost frame-
work, by contrast is primarily about asset or 
value protection, not value creation9  
 
2.2.  Relationship to Transaction Cost 
Theory7
The transactions cost approach is widely 
accepted as a framework for understanding 
economic organization.  This perspective 
sees markets and hierarchies as alternative 
mechanisms for organizing transactions.  In 
order to economize on transaction costs, 
production is frequently required to be or-
ganized in firms.  Transaction cost econom-
ics builds on the assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 
1975, 1985).  Contractual efficiency is im-
paired when switching costs have to be 
incurred to change suppliers.  In such cir-
cumstances, vertical integration is likely to 
be superior according to transaction cost 
analysis.8  
 
                                                                                                  
7 Parts of this section draws on Teece (2003) 9 The way in which governance (choice of firm 
boundary) issues do come into play in strategic 
management is well illustrated in Teece (1986), 
where there is extensive discussion of complemen-
tary assets and whether or not these should be inter-
nalized.  Deciding whether to “own” or “rent” (i.e. 
integrate or outsource) complementary assets de-
pends on whether the assets were available in com-
petitive supply.  A concern to focus on is the distri-
bution of gains (and losses) between the innovator 
and the owners of the complementary assets.  Wil-
liamson also explores appropriability through ex 
 
8 The link between transaction cost economics and 
strategy was present already when Williamson 
(1975) demonstrated the relevance of transaction 
cost ideas to issues of corporate strategy (such as 
efficient firm boundaries); and the Chandler-
Williamson M-form hypothesis quickly became a 
key insight in the strategic management field, in 
particular after being supported by a number of 
empirical studies, beginning with Armour and Teece 
(1978). 
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Williamson clearly recognizes that even in 
the world of transaction cost economics, 
governance costs are not the only costs that 
are relevant to the firm.  “Production costs” 
are mentioned, but not analyzed deeply.  
However, much lies within “production 
costs” that economists and management 
scholars need to understand.  They include 
not just operational issues, but strategic 
issues too.  Some production related issues 
are operational - - such as the establishment 
of flexible procurement, enabling the firm 
to take advantage of changing competitive 
pricing – and some highly strategic, such as 
whether or not to invest in a new plant, 
whether to advance a new generation of 
products now, later, or never.  Clearly, the 
performance of a business is going to be 
very significantly impacted by production 
and investment choices, as well as by gov-
ernance choices.10   
In short, the (dynamic) capabilities frame-
work suggests that the scope of the firm 
cannot be explained just by transaction cost 
considerations.  Rather, asset selection (in-
ternalization) decisions must also make 
reference to complementarities and cospe-
cialization for reasons of scope economies, 
and appropriability (Teece, 2003).   
 
The complementarity between transaction 
cost economics and dynamic capabilities 
has been recognized by Williamson, Teece 
and Winter.11  Williamson notes that trans-
action cost and internal firm perspectives 
“deal with partly overlapping phenomenon, 
often in complementary ways” (1999, p. 
1098).  Indeed, the very first empirical 
study to show the predictive power of asset 
specificity in setting firm boundaries (Mon-
teverde and Teece, 1982) also showed that 
                                                                        
                                                                        
weight diesel technology at the G.M. Labs.  The 
earliest use was in submarines. Alfred P. Sloan, 
GM’s Chairman, saw the possibility of applying the 
technology to make diesel electric locomotives.  
(Steam power was, at the time, completely domi-
nant).  G.M. needed capabilities resident in the lo-
comotive manufacturers, and at Westinghouse Elec-
tric.  As Langlois notes:  “The three sets of capabili-
ties might have been combined by some kind of 
contract or joint venture.  But the steam manufactur-
ers – Alco, Baldwin, and Lima – failed to cooperate.  
This was not, however, because they feared hold-up 
in the face of highly specific assets.  Rather, it was 
because they actively denied the desirability of the 
diesel and fought its introduction at every step.  
General Motors was forced to create its own capa-
bilities in locomotive manufacturer (p. 115).” 
poste recontracting.  However, the appropriability 
issues of most concern to business managers do not 
come from a pure form of what Williamson calls 
“the fundamental transformation”. With this trans-
formation, an exante large numbers bargaining 
situation is transformed into a small numbers situa-
tion after idiosyncratic irreversible investment assets 
are deployed, and recontracting hazards result.  
Rather, it is simply that technological innovation 
changes the demand for certain inputs (resources) 
and their complements.  The entity that can cleverly 
bargain to obtain a “long” position in those assets on 
favorable terms will be able to appropriate a greater 
share of the gains from innovation.  Put differently, 
in Teece (1986), it is asset selection based on value 
creation that shapes firm boundary selection issues – 
not just the minimization of transaction costs. 
 
11 For other relevant and informative – although 
perhaps a bit more skeptical - discussions of the 
complementarity between transaction cost theory 
and capability ideas, see Dosi and Marengo, 2000; 
Dosi, 2004.  
 
10 For instance, Langlois (1992) highlights the case 
of the diesel electric locomotive, where in the 1920s, 
Charles Kettering had developed advanced light-
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even greater predictive power was associ-
ated with cospecialization or “systems inte-
gration” causing Teece (1990) to observe 
that: [I]n order to fully develop its capabili-
ties, transaction cost economics must be 
joined with a theory of knowledge and pro-
duction (p. 59; also see Winter, 1988).12 As 
a result, scholars began looking elsewhere 
to develop more robust theories of the firm.  
Behavioral and evolutionary economics has 
been recognized as another source of useful 
insights.  
cisions in a firm (Cyert and March, 1963).  
Whereas goals in neoclassical theory are 
pictured as given alternatives each with a 
set of consequences attached, goals within 
behavioral theory are pictured as reflecting 
the demands of a political coalition, chang-
ing as the composition of that coalition 
changes.  Thus, the theory treats the de-
mands of shareholders, managers, workers, 
customers, suppliers, and creditors as com-
ponents of the operational goals of a firm. 
At the same time, not all goals are salient at 
all times.   Rather, specific goals are evoked 
by the presence of coalition members in the 
decision neighborhood, by the divisional 
organization of the firm, and by the recog-
nition of particular problems.  Aspirations 
with respect to each dimension of the goals 
were pictured as changing in response to 
the experience of the organization and its 
components as well as the experience of 
others to whom they compare themselves.  
Thus, it is the dynamic nature of aspirations 
which enables the generation of new deci-
sion alternatives.  Therefore, the firm must 
engage in active search and imagination to 
create sustainable strategic opportunities 
(Winter, 2000).  
 
2.3. Relationship to the Behavioral The-
ory of the Firm 
The behavioral theory of the firm is a more 
dynamic perspective than transaction cost 
theory.  It wasn’t intended as a theory of 
strategy; but several insights from the be-
havioral perspective are used in both the 
resource based view (Barney, 1991) and 
dynamic capability theory (Teece et al, 
2002).  
 
The behavioral theory is built around a po-
litical conception of organizational goals, a 
bounded rationality conception of expecta-
tions, an adaptive conception of rules and 
aspirations, and a set of ideas about how the 
interactions among these factors affect de- 
 
In the behavioral view, agents have only 
limited rationality, meaning that behavior in 
organizations is intendedly rational; neither 
emotive nor aimless (March and Simon, 
1958. Since firms are seen as heterogene-
                                                 
12 Various studies have now shown that compe-
tences/cospecialization also play a role in the make 
or buy decision (Walker and Weber, 1984;  Jaco-
bides and Hitt, 2001). 
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ous, boundedly rational entities that have to 
search for relevant information, expecta-
tions in the behavioral theory is portrayed 
as the result of making inferences from 
available information, involving both the 
process by which information is made 
available and to the processes of drawing 
inferences.  Since information is costly, it is 
generated by search activity.  The intensity 
of search depends on the performance of 
the organization relative to aspirations and 
the amount of organizational slack (March 
and Simon, 1958, pp. 47-52).  The direction 
of search is affected by the location (in the 
organization) or search activity and the 
definition of the problem stimulating the 
activity.  Thus, the search activity of the 
organization furthers both the generation of 
new alternative strategies, and facilitates 
the anticipation of uncertain futures. 
 
Decision-making in the behavioral theory is 
seen as taking place in response to a prob-
lem, through the use of standard operating 
procedures and other routines, and also 
through search for an alternative that is 
acceptable from the point of view of current 
aspiration levels for evoked goals.  Choice 
is affected, therefore, by the definition of a 
problem, by existing rules (which reflect 
past learning by the organization), by the 
order in which alternatives are considered 
(which reflects the location of decision 
making in the organization and past experi-
ence), and by anything that affects aspira-
tions and attention.13
 
Cyert and March (1963) emphasized the 
uniqueness in firms; organizations and or-
ganizational actors differ in terms of their 
aspirations, their knowledge, and their deci-
sions.  In terms of relevance to strategy, the 
most basic contribution of the behavioral 
theory of the firm is the importance of firm 
heterogeneity (Teece et al, 2002).  Winter 
(2000) also uses the ideas on satisficing and 
dynamic aspiration levels to suggest an 
ecological and evolutionary perspective in 
which learning is a dynamic capability.  
Dynamic capability theory builds on behav-
ioral ideas of adaptation and dynamic char-
acter of expectations and goals (Teece et al 
2002). 
 
2.4. Relationship to Evolutionary ideas of 
the firm (and strategy) 
The evolutionary theory of the firm goes 
back to (at least) Alfred Marshall’s con-
                                                 
13 Within this framework, four concepts were devel-
oped.  The first is the quasi-resolution of conflict, 
the idea that firms function with considerable latent 
conflict of interests but do not necessarily resolve 
that conflict explicitly.  The second is uncertainty 
avoidance.  Although firms try to anticipate an un-
predictable future insofar as they can, they also try 
to restructure their worlds in order to minimize their 
dependence on anticipation of the highly uncertain 
future.  The third concept is problemistic search, the 
idea that search within a firm is stimulated primarily 
by problems and directed to solving those problems.  
The fourth concept is organizational learning.  The 
theory assumes that firms learn from their own ex-
periences and the experiences of others.  
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struction of the industry equilibrium, which 
combined a population of firms in disequi-
librium with industry level supply-demand 
equilibrium, frequently using biological 
analogies.14  A representative firm is hy-
pothesized to bridge the dynamic analysis 
of firm level and the static industry level. 
“[F]irms rise and fall”, Marshall said, “but 
the representative firm remains always of 
the same size” (1925, p. 367).  
“The assumption that conduct is prompt 
and rational is in all cases a fiction.  But it 
proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if 
things have time to hammer logic into men.  
Where this has happened, and within the 
limits in which it has happened, one may 
rest content with this fiction and build theo-
ries … Outside of these limits our fiction 
loses its closeness to reality.  To cling to it 
there also as traditional theory does, is to 
hide an essential thing and to ignore a fact 
which, in contrast with other deviations of 
our assumption from reality, is theoretically 
important and the source of the explanation 
of phenomena which would not exist with-
out it” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 80).  
 
Many ideas significant for the development 
of the evolutionary view were also intro-
duced by Joseph Schumpeter. For instance, 
although the idea of rules based or bounded 
rationality became associated with Simon 
(1955) and March and Simon (1958) (and 
then later embedded in Nelson and Winter 
(1982)), Schumpeter was early to recognize 
that bounded rationality is necessary for a 
theory of innovation and dynamics: 
 
  
                                                 
                                                
Evolutionary ideas also surfaced during the 
profit maximization debate in economics 
involving Fritz Machlup, Milton Friedman 
(1953), Armen Alchian (1950, 1953) and 
Edith Penrose (1952, 1953).  The debate 
(concerning, among other things, the role of 
intentionality in economic selection and the 
use of a population of heterogeneous firms 
as a basis for selection) led to the formal 
evolutionary work by Winter (1964, 1971, 
1975).15  
14 As Marshall explains in his ‘Principles’: “we may 
read a lesson from the young trees in the forest as 
they struggle upwards through the benumbing shade 
of their older rivals. Many succumb on the way, and 
a few only survive; those few become stronger with 
every year, they get a larger share of light and air 
with every increase of their height, and at last in 
their turn they tower above their neighbors.  One 
tree will last longer in full vigor and attain a greater 
size than another; but sooner or later age tells on 
them all.  And as with the growth of trees, so was it 
with the growth of business as a general rule before 
the great recent development of vast joint-stock 
companies, which often stagnate, but do not readily 
die” (Marshall, 1925, p. 315-316). For excellent 
discussions of Marshall’s evolutionary ideas, see the 
work of Brian Loasby (1976, 1989). 
 
15 In contrast to the position of Friedman and others, 
evolutionary theory emphasizes that selection does 
not always lead to efficient outcomes because firms 
operate in a context or environment of other firms.  
“In fact”, Nelson and Winter writes, “there is good 
reason to expect the opposite, since selection forces 
may be expected to be ‘sensible’ and to trade off 
maladaptation under unusual or unencountered con-
ditions to achieve good adaptations to conditions 
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Despite these prominent predecessors, an 
evolutionary view of the firm wasn’t devel-
oped until decades later.  In what was first 
intended to be entitled “a Neo Schumpete-
rian Theory of the Firm”, Nelson and Win-
ter (1982) integrated insights from Schum-
peter with ideas from Armen Alchain, 
Friederich Hayek and Cyert and March 
(1963).16  
tition in the product market constitutes an 
important part of the selection environment 
of confronting firms. 
 
In order to fully understand these (and re-
lated) issues and their implications for theo-
ries of the firm and strategic management, 
scholars have appealed to the idea of firms 
as knowledge-bearing and learning entities; 
and a notion of the firm as endogenously 
creating its productive opportunity set.  
This line of thought was provided by Edith 
Penrose (1959).  Penrose (1959) was the 
first to argue that the firm is a repository of 
capabilities and knowledge and that learn-
ing is central to firm growth and to provide 
a theory of firms that explicitly makes room 
for issues relating to the production and 
exploitation of productive knowledge. Pro-
ductive knowledge is often related to other 
organizational (material) assets.17  The 
firm, she said, is “both an administrative 
organization and a collection of productive 
resources, both human and material” (p. 
320).  The services rendered by these re-
sources are the primary inputs into a firm’s 
 
The firm in their view is seen as a profit 
seeking entity whose primary activities are 
to build (through organizational learning 
processes) and exploit valuable knowledge 
assets.  Firms in this view also come with 
‘routines’ or ‘competencies’, which are 
recurrent patterns of action which may 
change through search and learning.  Rou-
tines will seldom be ‘optimal’ and will dif-
fer among agents and behaviors cannot be 
deduced from simply observing the envi-
ronmental signals (such as prices) that 
agents are exposed to.  This variety drives 
the evolutionary process since firms articu-
late rent-seeking strategies on the basis of 
their routines and competencies and compe-
                                                                                                                         
17 As Penrose writes: “For physical resources the 
range of services inherent in any given resource 
depends on the physical characteristics of the re-
source, and it is probably safe to assume that at any 
given time the known productive services inherent 
in a resource do not exhaust the full potential of the 
resource... The possibilities of using services change 
with changes in knowledge.. there is a close connec-
tion between the type of knowledge possessed by 
the personnel in the firm and the services obtainable 
from its material resources” (1959, p. 76). 
frequently encountered.  In a context of progressive 
change, therefore, one should not expect to observe 
ideal adaptation to current conditions by the prod-
ucts of evolutionary change” (1982, p. 154). 
 
16 The title, ‘Towards a Neoschumpeterian Theory 
of the Firm’ was the title of Winter’s first working 
paper, written at the RAND Corporation (Winter, 
1968), which became the main basis of the Nelson 
and Winter collaboration, leading to Nelson and 
Winter (1982). 
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production processes and are firm specific 
in the sense that they are a function of the 
knowledge and experience that the firm has 
acquired over time.  When services that are 
currently going unused are applied to new 
lines of business, these services also func-
tion as a growth engine for the firm.  Learn-
ing enables the organization to use its re-
sources more efficiently.  As a result, even 
firms that maintain a constant level of capi-
tal may nevertheless be able to grow as 
services are freed up for new uses as a re-
sult of organizational learning.18  
 
3. The Evolving Dynamics of Organiza-
tional Capabilities 
Because firms face strategic decisions on 
the basis of past history, it is natural to 
view questions relating to the development 
of strategy and competences in an evolu-
tionary setting (Simon, 1993; Winter, 
2000).  The most recent chapter in the his-
tory of competencies and capabilities is the 
dynamic capabilities approach, which seeks 
to provide a coherent (and evolutionary) 
                                                 
                                                
framework, which can both integrate exist-
ing conceptual and empirical knowledge 
and facilitate prescription.  First outlined in 
Teece and Pisano (1994) and elaborated in 
Teece et al (1997), a paper which had circu-
lated for seven years as a working paper,19 
the dynamic capabilities approach builds 
upon the theoretical foundations provided 
by Schumpeter (1934), Penrose (1959), 
Williamson (1975, 1985), Cyert and March 
(1963), Rumelt (1984),  Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Teece (1982) and Teece et al 
(1994).  In particular, it is consistent with 
the Schumpeterian view that the emergence 
of new products and processes results from 
new combinations of knowledge.  In a simi-
lar vein, it is argued in the dynamic capa-
bilities approach that competitive success 
arises from the continuous development 
and reconfiguration of firm-specific assets 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al, 
1997).  Whereas Penrose and the resource-
based scholars recognize the competitive 
importance of firm-specific capabilities, 
researchers of the dynamic capabilities ap-
proach attempt to outline specifically how 
organizations develop and renew internal 
competencies.  Thus, the latter approach is 
concerned with a subset of a firm’s overall 
capabilities, namely, those that allow firms 
18 Teece’s paper on the multiproduct firm  (Teece, 
1982) was the first to apply Penrose’s ideas to stra-
tegic management issues.  He focused on her obser-
vation that human capital in firms is usually not 
entirely ‘specialized’ and can therefore be 
(re)deployed to allow the firm’s diversification into 
new products and services.  He also used Penrose’s 
view that firms possess excess resources which can 
be used for diversification.  Later, Wernerfelt (1984) 
cites Penrose for “the idea of looking at firms as a 
broader set of resources … [and] the optimal growth 
of the firm involves a balance between exploitation 
of existing resources and development of new ones” 
. 
 
19 This explains why references to dynamic capabili-
ties began before the publication of this paper.  In 
the early to mid 90’s, the working paper versions 
were quoted.  See for instance Mahoney and Pan-
dian (1992). 
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to create new knowledge and to disseminate 
it throughout the organization.  
Chester Barnard’s view of the firm was that 
it was fundamentally a structure to achieve 
coordination and adaptation.  But as Wil-
liamson (1990) observes, Barnard did not 
compare the firm to markets in terms of 
their coordinative or adaptive capabilities.  
One key difference is that the firm achieves 
coordination and adaptation with respect to 
non-traded or thinly traded assets; the mar-
ket on the other hand enables rapid adapta-
tion with respect to assets which are ac-
tively traded in thick markets (Teece, 
2003).   
 
The dynamic capability perspective follows 
Hayek (1945) (and the behavioral and evo-
lutionary theorists) in emphasizing that 
coordination as an economic problem only 
occurs because of change.  In a static envi-
ronment a short period of “set up” would be 
required to organize economic activity; but 
absent change in consumer tastes or tech-
nology, economic agents (both traders and 
managers) would sort out the optimal flows 
of goods and services (together with meth-
ods of production).  Thereafter, there would 
be no need for their services.   
 
However, dynamic capabilities involve 
much more than “coordination” and “adap-
tation”, and the functions of the (strategic) 
manager go beyond what Barnard and Wil-
liamson have identified. In particular, coor-
dination and adaptation do not convey very 
well notions such as proactive search, se-
lection and subsequent implementation of 
particular courses of action critical to firms’ 
business strategies.  Nor does it convey the 
importance of asset alignment, opportunity 
identification, and access to critical cospe-
cialized assets.  These are all critical ele-
ments of management’s dynamic capabili-
ties, and are important to value creation. 
 
Now introduce change.  If there were a 
complete set of forward and contingent 
claims markets, adjustments would occur 
automatically; absent a complete set of fu-
tures and contingent claims markets, there 
is the need for economic agents to engage 
in trading activities, and for manag-
ers/entrepreneurs to “integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external compe-
tences to address rapidly changing envi-
ronments” (Teece et al., 1997).  Coordinat-
ing and adapting effectively to changing 
environments (Cyert and March 1963) is an 
element of a firm’s dynamic capabilities.  
Barnard (1938) and Richardson (1960) 
were early to develop these themes.   
 
Put another way, the need for firms’ to have 
dynamic capabilities stems from what can 
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be thought of as “market failures”.20 The 
“market failure” at issue is not due just to 
high transaction costs and contractual in-
completeness.21 Rather, it is associated with 
the non-existence of certain markets and the 
need to identify, align, adapt, and coordi-
nate activities and assets, especially com-
plementary assets.   
ignored.  Under guidance from the strategy 
manager, the ability of (complementary) 
asset owners to block innovation can be 
eliminated through acquisition, or worked 
around through additional investment. 
 
G.B. Richardson (1960) has remarked upon 
the information problems associated with 
achieving coordination and investment de-
cisions.  However, his focus is on industry 
level coordination of investment.  He iden-
tified situations where limited information 
about competitor’s investment decisions 
may impede efficient-investment.  This is 
not the focus here.  The essential coordina-
tion task identified in the dynamic capabili-
ties framework is internal to the firm, 
though it may well involve strategic alli-
ances with other firms too.   
 
Complementarities frequently exist 
amongst assets used in the firm, and fre-
quently exist with assets outside the firm.  
These complementarities are easy to man-
age when markets are thick, as standard 
purchase and sale agreements or term con-
tacts ought suffice.  But when markets are 
thin, or non-existent, alignment isn’t neces-
sarily achieved by trades.  It’s the job of the 
(strategic) manager to decide what invest-
ments are to be made and what assets are to 
be purchased and how complementarities 
are to be achieved.  Inside the firm, the 
strategy manager can ensure that new task 
boundaries are created and existing ones 
 
Needless to say, the proficient achievement 
of the necessary coordination is by no 
means assured inside the firm.  Decision 
makers need information on changing con-
sumer needs and technology.  Such infor-
mation is not always available; or if it is 
available, is likely to be incomplete, or 
highly subjective (Casson 2000, p. 119; 
Simon 1993).  Managers are of course deci-
sion makers and they must collect informa-
tion, analyze it, synthesize it, and act upon 
it inside the firm.  Situations are dealt with 
in many ways, sometimes by creating rules, 
which specify how the organization will 
                                                 
20 The use of the term “market failure” is only rela-
tive to the theoretical norm of absolute static and 
dynamic efficiency.  Of course, a (private) enter-
prise economic system as a whole achieves an effi-
cient allocation of resources, as strategic managers 
and the organization they lead are an inherent part of 
the economic system.  However, the framework 
does highlight the fact that management systems and 
corporate governance must function well for a pri-
vate enterprise market oriented system to function 
well. 
 
 
21 To the extent that transaction costs are relevant, it 
is of the dynamic variety (See Langlois 1992). 
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respond to the observations made (March 
and Simon, 1958).  If this path is chosen, 
then rules may become codified and rou-
tinely applied (Casson 2000, p.129) when-
ever certain changes are detected.22  How-
ever, such rules need to be periodically re-
vised for the firm to have dynamic capabili-
ties. 
firms (Chandler, 1990; Teece, 1993; 
Simon, 1991).  Put simply, firms and mar-
kets coevolve.  Hence, while the need for 
asset coordination and orchestration and 
associated investment choices may be the 
fundamental problem which the firm’s dy-
namic capabilities help address, the firm’s 
dynamic capabilities – particularly its abil-
ity to introduce new products and services 
into the market – not only shapes markets; 
it also requires firm-level responses by 
competitors, suppliers, and sometimes cus-
tomers.  
 
In some circumstances, new information 
and new situations may be best dealt with 
by forming a new firm (Knight, 1921).23 
Those who discover the new information, 
and can figure out the appropriate response, 
need not be the same individual(s) who 
start a new enterprise; but given the ab-
sence of a well functioning market for in-
formation about new market opportunities, 
the discoverer and the enterprise founder 
may need to be one and the same.   
 
 
The coordinating and resource allocating 
capabilities featured in dynamic capabilities 
shape markets, as much as markets shape 
                                                 
                                                
The emergence/development of markets is 
thus important for strategic management.  
Elsewhere (Teece,1998) the emergence of 
intermediate product markets was identified 
as a major leveler in competition, enabling 
more specialists firms to compete and pro-
vide a limited kind of innovation, called 
autonomous innovation.  There are parts of 
the value chain which ought to be out-
sourced when well functioning intermediate 
(product) markets exist.24   
22 Casson argues that rule making is entrepreneurial, 
but that rule implementation is routine, and is char-
acterized by managerial and administrative work. 
 
4. Research Agenda Implications 
 
‘Competencies’ and ‘capabilities’ are se-
ductive concepts.  They are significant parts 
23 Frank Knight was (probably) the first to argue a 
distinct entrepreneurial theory of the firm (Langlois 
and Cosgel 1993).  In particular, Knight thought of 
entrepreneurs as possessing different judgments 
(and different capacities for judgments) and acting 
upon (and profiting from) genuine uncertainty and 
unpredictability: “[I]t is true uncertainty which by 
preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of 
the tendencies of competition gives the characteris-
tic form of ‘enterprise’ to economic organization as 
a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the 
entrepreneur” (Knight 1921, p. 232). 
 
24 The creation of intermediate markets is not readily 
explained by asset specificity concerns, as implied 
by transaction cost economics.  The absence of 
standards, or simply the decisions by incumbent 
firms to size production so as to avoid the need to 
sell intermediate products are possible explanations 
for the enigma of markets for intermediate inputs. 
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of many modern theories of organization 
and strategic management; yet there’s con-
siderable confusion about the precise nature 
of the concepts (Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 
2000).  Recent contributions have clarified 
the key ideas somewhat (Winter, 2003; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2003).  
The full implications for a research agenda 
are still to be explored; however, we can 
outline at least the following important im-
plications for research theory of the firm 
and strategic management; and for issues 
relating to entrepreneurship/leadership. 
 
4.1. Strategic Management and the The-
ory of the Firm 
Ronald Coase was well aware that econo-
mists have neglected the role of manage-
ment in the theory of the firm when he 
noted that “economists have tended to ne-
glect the main activity of the firm, running 
a business” (1988, p. 38).  There is no role 
for the manager in the economic theory of 
the firm.  Although Williamson claims that 
the role of management is “significant” in 
transaction cost economics (1999, p. 1101), 
his support for the assertion makes refer-
ence to the emphasis in transaction cost 
economics on the adaptive properties of 
organization, and recognition that manage-
ment can exercise “fiat”.  This is clearly 
inadequate.  In the dynamic capabilities 
framework, management plays distinctive 
roles in selecting and/or developing rou-
tines, making investment choices, and in 
orchestrating non-tradable assets.  This is a 
more robust role for management than 
transaction cost economics has so far af-
forded. 
 
But whatever differences may exist in 
transaction cost economics with respect to 
the role of the manager, they pale next to 
models of the neoclassical firm in econom-
ics where managers and the management 
function have been blotted out.25 As Bau-
mol puts it: 
 
“Obviously, the entrepreneur has been read 
out of the model.  There is no room for en-
terprise or initiative.  The management 
group becomes a passive calculator that 
reacts mechanically to changes imposed on 
it by fortuitous external developments over 
which it does not exert, and does not even 
attempt to exert, any influence.  One hears 
                                                 
25 Consider the nature of the model of the firm.  In 
its simplest form – the theoretical firm must choose 
among alternative values for a small number of 
well-defined variables; price, output, perhaps adver-
tising outlay.  In making this choice management is 
taken to consider the costs and revenues associated 
with each candidate set of values, as described by 
the relevant functional relationships, equations, and 
inequalities.  Explicitly or implicitly the firm is then 
taken to perform a mathematical calculation which 
yields optimal (i.e., profit maximizing) values for all 
of its decision variables and it is these values which 
the theory assumes to be chosen – which are taken 
to constitute the business decision.  There matters 
rest, forever or until exogenous forces lead to an 
autonomous change in the environment.  Until there 
is such a shift in one of the relationships that define 
the problem, the firm is taken to replicate precisely 
its previous decisions, day after day, year after year. 
 17
 
 
 
of no clever ruses, ingenious schemes, bril-
liant innovations, of no charisma or of any 
of the other stuff of which outstanding en-
trepreneurship is made; one does not hear 
of them because there is no way in which 
they can fit into the model” (Baumol, 1968, 
p. 67). 
ences asset selection and asset orchestration 
as a part of dynamic capabilities.   
 
In an economic system, principals and/or 
their agents must design and implement 
processes to manage change, must direct 
the reinvestment of cash flow, and must 
configure asset portfolios, including allo-
cating resources between exploitation and 
exploration (March, 1991, 1994). They 
must also stand ready to reconfigure them 
as circumstances change.  In a strict evolu-
tionary views of the world, there is no spe-
cific agent and no hierarchy responsible for 
regulating the evolutionary process 
(Cohendet, Llerena and Marengo 2000).   
 
Winter and Teece (1984) likewise observed 
that entrepreneurship had been suppressed 
in the theory of the firm.  Serious questions 
are raised with respect to the value of neo-
classical models in management theory, 
management education, and, by implica-
tion, management practice.  
 
4.2 Strategic Management and Entre-
preneur (and leader-)ship  
 
However, in a less evolutionary view of the 
world, there is room for a managerial and 
entrepreneurial function.  The manager/ 
entrepreneur need not be an individual; in 
the modern corporation it is a function.  As 
Schumpeter (1949) noted:  “The entrepre-
neurial function may be and often is filled 
cooperatively – in  many cases, therefore, it 
is difficult or even impossible to name an 
individual that acts as “the entrepreneur.” 
(pp. 71-72). 
It is important to understand the role of 
management in the dynamic capabilities 
framework advanced above.  If, as Winter 
(2003) and others suggest, dynamic capa-
bilities are defined mainly around high-
level routines, perhaps the role of (strate-
gic) management is reduced and relegated 
to selecting new routines.  Certainly, if in-
novation becomes truly a routine in large 
firms, then the manager/intrapreneur has a 
modest role to play after the routines are in 
place.  The framework presented above 
suggests a bigger role because it also refer-
 
The manager/entrepreneur must articulate 
goals, set culture, build trust, and play a 
critical role in the key strategic decisions.  
Clearly the role of the entrepreneur and the 
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manager overlap to a considerable extent.  
As Simon (1991) recognized:  
 
“Especially in the case of new or expand-
ing firms, the entrepreneur does not face an 
abstract capital market.  He or she exerts 
much effort to induce potential investors to 
share the company’s views (often optimis-
tic) about its prospects.  This executive is 
much closer to Schumpeter’s entrepreneur 
than to the entrepreneur of current neo-
classical theory.  Whether the firm expands 
or contracts is determined not just by how 
its customers respond to it, but by how in-
sightful, sanguine and energetic its owners 
and managers are about its opportunities” 
(p. 31).   
 
The manager/entrepreneur plays a key role 
in achieving asset selection and the “coor-
dination” of economic activity, particularly 
when complementary assets must be as-
sembled.  The manager/entrepreneur can 
bargain and negotiate and buy or sell or 
swap investments/assets, orchestrate inter-
nal assets (intrapreneurship) and transact 
with the owners of external assets (entre-
preneurship).  He is likely to have strong 
skills in working out new “business mod-
els”, which define the architecture of new 
businesses (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002).  The astute performance of this func-
tion will help achieve what Porter (1996) 
calls “strategic fit”, not just with internally 
controlled assets, but with the assets of alli-
ance partners.26  The manager/entrepreneur 
can also shape learning processes with the 
firm.  These are not functions which can be 
achieved by markets divorced from manag-
ers/entrepreneurs. 
 
Thus the entrepreneur/manager function in 
the dynamic capabilities framework is in 
part Schumpeterian (the entrepreneur intro-
duces novelty and seeks new combinations) 
and in part evolutionary (the entrepreneur 
endeavors to promote and shape learning).   
Whether intrapreneur or entrepreneur, the 
function senses new opportunities and leads 
the organization forward to seize them.  
The entrepreneur/ manager must therefore 
lead.  These are roles not recognized by 
economic theory; but these roles are the 
essence of dynamic capabilities and are 
critical to the theory of strategic manage-
ment. 
 
                                                 
26 As Porter (1996) notes, “[S]trategic fit among 
many activities is fundamental not only to competi-
tive advantage but also to sustainability of that ad-
vantage.  It is harder for a rival to match an array of 
interlocked activities than it is merely to imitate a 
particular sales force approach, match a process 
technology, or replicate a set of product features.” 
(p. 73)  [And] “when activities complement each 
other, rivals will get very little benefit from imita-
tion unless they successfully match the whole sys-
tem – frequent  shifts in positioning are costly -- 
strategy is creating a fit among a company’s activi-
ties.  The success of strategy depends on doing 
many things well – not just a few in an integrating 
among them.  If there is not fit among activities, 
there is not distinctive strategy and little sustainabil-
ity.” (p. 77) 
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5. Conclusion 
Several decades with evolutionary theory 
has brought shifting focus on several fronts.  
Not only has areas such as economics, 
management and strategy become enriched 
with evolutionary ideas, but also concepts 
such as routines, competencies, capabilities 
and learning rose from neglected subfields 
to attain near parity with old concepts of 
organization and management theory; and 
ideas on competences and capabilities have 
begun to emerge as viable complements not 
only neoclassical economics, but also much 
of transaction cost theory (Dosi, 2004).  
Most of this new discussion takes place 
within the analytical framework of evolu-
tionary (and neoschumpeterian) theory, 
broadly speaking.  
 
Such a framework invites research on en-
trepreneurship, organizational learning and 
the role of the manager/leader of the firm.  
The dynamic capability view sets off from 
several evolutionary ideas and sees the firm 
as an incubator and repository for difficult 
to replicate assets; and technological and 
knowledge assets are central.  Distinctive 
processes support the creation, protection, 
and augmentation of firm-specific assets 
and competences.  These assets and compe-
tences reflect both individual skills and 
experiences as well as distinctive ways of 
doing things inside firms.  To the extent 
that such assets and competences are diffi-
cult to imitate and are effectively deployed 
and redeployed in the marketplace (reflect-
ing dynamic capabilities), they can provide 
the foundations for competitive advantage.  
 
Dynamic capability was intended in the 
beginning as a set of ideas around flexibil-
ity, adaptability, integration, disintegration, 
etc.  Increasing focus on changing knowl-
edge assets, technology, etc. has spurred 
increasing focus on organizational change 
and how environments and histories of 
business firms shape organizational forms, 
practices and competencies.  As a result, 
the dynamic capability perspective seeks to 
explore how changes in the world are likely 
to result in changes in business firms, and 
how organizations can improve and survive 
by developing and positioning dynamic 
capabilities. 
 
The dynamic capability perspective is still 
developing; we may even see it as ‘pre-
paradigmatic’, in Thomas Kuhn’s terminol-
ogy.  As a theoretical perspective, the dy-
namic capability framework offers an inte-
grative methodology and perspective in 
which several theoretical traditions are used 
as tools for analyzing the dynamics of busi-
ness organizations. Understanding and util-
izing ideas from different traditions – trans-
action cost theory, evolutionary economics 
and behavioral theory – provides a unique 
intellectual platform for dynamic capabili-
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ties. Such an integrative approach is also 
consistent with Schumpter’s view on using 
theories from the past as well as from the 
present to analyze economic growth and 
change: 
 
“The time may have come … to co-ordinate 
and to organize [different past theoretical 
traditions] work by means of comprehen-
sive ‘programs’ and to provide, for the use 
of the individual research worker, orderly 
schemata of possible problems. It is here, 
and it its instrumental capacity, not as a 
master but as a servant of historical re-
search, that theory may prove useful” 
(Schumpeter, 1947, p. 9). 
 
The future relevance of competences and 
capabilities within strategic management 
will depend on whether future develop-
ments in the field will bring us closer to an 
empirically relevant paradigm, which can 
accommodate and address issues relating to 
the dynamics of the business enterprise.  
This in turn will depend on the ability of 
the scholars and ideas within strategic man-
agement to work together and for the re-
search program to accommodate an inter-
disciplinary vision, and to be disciplined 
(March, 1996).  Such a (interdisciplinary, 
yet disciplined) vision is the first step to-
ward realizing a coherent program in stra-
tegic management; and we may see the 
dynamic capability program as taking the 
first important steps toward establishing a 
coherent and rigorous research program in 
strategic management.  By integrating ideas 
from other traditions, the dynamic capabil-
ity program sets a research agenda for fu-
ture studies in strategic management.  Fu-
ture areas of research include (but are not 
limited to) the nature of the firm, strategic 
management and entrepreneur- and leader-
ship. 
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